INTRODUCTION
Many legal systems understand consumer insolvency laws as a form of social insurance.
1 The law's discharge of debt provides relief to financially troubled households falling outside the social safety net and so operates as an "insurer of last resort". In England and Wales, personal insolvency law in practice functions similarly, invoked by debtors of little income and few assets to obtain respite from financial difficulty and creditor collection efforts. As a matter of legal principle and policy, however, English law is ambivalent in its acceptance of this view of personal insolvency law. Instead, policymakers, judges and commentators tend to divide the law's theoretical basis between two primary objectives: debt collection and the maximisation of returns to creditors, as well as the provision of debt relief to over-indebted individuals under the "fresh start" policy. Underpinning the first of these aims is the view that insolvency law should involve "as few dislocations as possible" from pre-bankruptcy market allocations. 2 The fresh start policy, in contrast, understands that " [v] iewed in its proper context… the law of personal insolvency functions as a mechanism of redistribution". 3 Tension exists between these "different and perhaps competing philosophical bases for the one legal process". 4 Since insolvency "legislation contains no hierarchical system of priorities", 5 the appropriate "balance" between the policy concerns is unclear.
6
This paper argues that contemporary economic conditions present a strong case for rebalancing the law towards the fresh start policy and its social insurance function. The Global Financial Crisis and subsequent Great Recession 7 have spurred scholars and policymakers to recognise the negative economic consequences of excessive household debt in triggering the crisis and in prolonging subsequent recession. 8 Economists increasingly advocate the merits of household debt relief policies, though often seeing "no economy-wide tools available for large-scale debt restructuring". 9 Personal insolvency is just such a tool, however, and this paper links this postcrisis debate with bankruptcy literature. It highlights the persuasive case for deploying personal insolvency as a social insurance mechanism to address "debt overhang" problems 10 and distribute more efficiently the risks inherent in a debt based economy.
The paper illustrates, however, that the lack of clarity as to how to balance the law's aims tends to obscure the public policy benefits of deploying the law in this manner. It focuses on a stark illustration of this problem in the Court of Appeal decision in Places for People Homes Ltd. v Sharples. Here a view of personal insolvency centred on creditor returns led to failure to recognise the law's social policy function just as the need for an "insurer of last resort" is particularly great, in the context of a contemporary UK housing crisis and an environment of recession, austerity and a stretched social safety net. Recent years have seen UK households' debt problems increasingly move from financial products to essential obligations such as central and local government debts, as well as rent arrears difficulties symptomatic of the housing crisis.
11 Perhaps surprisingly, scholars and policymakers have rarely travelled down the income distribution curve to consider these "hidden" 12 debt problems. 13 Existing treatments of consumer bankruptcy have tended to focus, for example, on credit card debt during the boom of the 2000s 14 or the mortgage debt epidemic of the post-crisis crash. 15 Consequently, the law must now construct fresh responses to questions posed by such debts' increasing salience and the contemporary environment's challenge to expand protection to those falling outside the social safety net.
This paper is an effort to advance this process. It interrogates the public policy aims of personal insolvency law, informed by lessons from the crisis and recession, and applies these ideas to a novel debt category through a case study of the Sharples decision. 16 In so doing, the paper adds to longstanding literature on bankruptcy's social insurance function and to current academic enquiries into the "regulatory welfare state" 17 and problems of precarious housing and eviction. 18 The paper argues that a strong policy case exists for titling the balance of personal insolvency law towards the fresh start policy and the law's social insurance role, even in the particular context of protecting debtors from eviction. Such an approach, absent in English law as represented by the Sharples case, is necessary to reconcile conceptual understandings of the law with its practical operation, and to allow the law to fulfil its potential in producing positive public policy responses to contemporary socio-economic challenges.
AMBIVALENCE OF AIMS IN PERSONAL INSOLVENCY LAW AND POLICY
Many other jurisdictions recognise well the role of personal insolvency law as part of the social safety net. In contrast to English law, 19 bankruptcy procedures were inaccessible to consumers in many European jurisdictions when a mass problem of household over-indebtedness first arose in the 1980s. This led to governments enacting a series of bespoke consumer debtadjustment laws, 20 which provided previously unavailable debt relief to troubled households and "were seen as part of the welfare state protection". households than all state unemployment insurance programs combined.
26 Even in nearby Scotland, policymakers appear to conceptualise personal insolvency law in welfare state terms, with recent reforms promising a national "financial health service".
27
This paper explores the extent to which one can see English personal insolvency law in this manner, particularly as contemporary economic conditions pressurise a shrinking social safety net and challenge the law to act as a social insurer of last resort. In terms of express policy statements, English law appears not to be fully committed to this view of the law. Rather it seems to adhere to a "firmly established tenet of time-worn bankruptcy lore… that the bankruptcy system serves two functions: the protection and payment of creditors; and the provision of shelter and a 'fresh start' to overburdened debtors". entrepreneurship by encouraging business risk-taking. 40 Nonetheless, policymakers emphasised the idea that debtors who "can pay, should pay" as a "key element of our bankruptcy system".
41
Reforms simultaneously enhanced procedures requiring bankrupt debtors to contribute income to creditors for up to three years. 42 Similar balance was evident in proposals by Government agency the Insolvency Service to modernise the Individual Voluntary Arrangement (IVA) insolvency procedure, which recognised both the need "to support the concept of a fresh start" and "to ensure the debtor pays the maximum affordable contribution". 43 The introduction of the Debt Relief Order procedure (DRO) in 2009 44 represented a more complete evolution. As confirmed by the courts, "the purpose of the DRO scheme is unadulterated debt relief", 45 and it involves no contributions to creditors from the debtor's assets/income. Instead, low-income debtors with very few assets owing limited amounts of debt simply obtain initial provisional protection from enforcement for one year, followed by full discharge of all non-excluded debts.
46
Even in proposing this means-tested mechanism, policymakers reiterated "that people who can pay… should do", and indicated that the bankruptcy procedure would ensure debtors of greater means make repayments to creditors. 47 The Insolvency Service's 2014 Call for Evidence further exemplifies this disunity of purpose. It considered concurrently a loosening of the restrictive means-based DRO access conditions (thus expanding debt relief), and amendments to the bankruptcy creditor petition procedure that left unquestioned bankruptcy's status as the "strongest of debt recovery tools".
48
Policymakers thus continue to view the law as serving simultaneously the aims of maximising returns to creditors and offering debtors a fresh start, while enacting recent reforms that have increasingly recognised the latter objective. The difficulty with this position is that many policy decisions and litigated questions involve a direct choice between these two aims, creating tension and risking the law's failure to achieve one or both objectives. In order to reconcile these aims and to evaluate where the law's priority should lie, it is necessary to interrogate the theoretical underpinnings of each objective. The paper now proceeds to do this, arguing that both lessons from the Great Recession and the contemporary practice of personal insolvency law undermine key assumptions of the debt collection objective, suggesting public policy benefits to tilting the law's balance towards debt relief and embracing its social insurance function. cooperate in liquidating assets for creditors' benefit. Pro rata distribution of the debtor's assets among creditors supports market allocations, "because it mimics the value of [creditors'] expected positions immediately before bankruptcy". 60 By facilitating predictable pro-rata recovery (rather than the unpredictable outcome of case-by-case races-to-court), insolvency law should assist business planning, reduce wasteful creditor competition, and produce more accurate and lower pricing of credit. 61 Ultimately, therefore, the case for maximising returns to creditors rests on the belief that this will allow credit to be most widely available at the lowest cost, and faith that this equates with an efficient allocation of resources.
The Fresh Start Policy and Personal Insolvency as Social Insurance
This position rests on assumptions regarding market efficiency, however, which struggle to hold in the face of contemporary conditions in consumer credit markets. The market failure rationale justifies personal insolvency's provision to debtors of relief from sub-optimal bargains produced by imperfect consumer credit markets. 62 Information asymmetries between lenders and borrowers and behavioural biases of consumers will systematically produce inefficient credit contracts. 63 The resulting severe costs of over-indebtedness are not just borne by parties to credit transactions but also by third parties, meaning that rather than enforce market allocations, personal insolvency has a role to play in internalising negative externalities. These social costs are multifarious, including for example expense to State social welfare systems in providing for financially troubled households' basic needs. 64 The recognised links between debt and health problems mean that mass over-indebtedness may also burden healthcare systems.
65
The "most powerful driving concerns" 66 of policymakers are wider systemic macro-economic costs of over-indebtedness. Debt problems may reduce employees' economic productivity, pushing debtors from the workforce either by making work uneconomical or through health problems that render employees unfit for work. 67 Similarly, English 68 and EU policymakers have seen debt relief laws as important facilitators of entrepreneurial productivity, safety nets that facilitate risk-taking necessary for business activity. 70 In contemporary conditions in which consumer demand is essential to economic growth, this logic suggests debt relief laws are equally necessary to restore over-indebted consumers to economically productive positions in which they can resume spending. 71 In response to the Great Recession, academic authors and international organisations have increasingly recognised the "debt overhang" problem of household over-indebtedness' disastrous effects on aggregate demand and so on economic growth. 72 The "harshness of debt" 73 inflicts losses of an economic downturn on borrowers (as employment, incomes and home values fall), while leaving creditors untouched with claims to full loan repayment and recourse to security. As borrowers are the members of society with the highest marginal propensity to consume, debt's distribution of losses onto borrowers leads to dramatic falls in consumption, triggering economic downturn. This calls for policies to redistribute losses more evenly, through contractual loss sharing mechanisms and expansive debt relief laws, 74 in order to restore debtors' ability to engage in growth-facilitating consumption.
75
The Great Recession's lesson that "debt matters" to economic growth and stability, 76 and that the inherent risks of a debt-based economy must be redistributed more efficiently, heightens understanding of personal insolvency law as a form of socio-economic or social insurance.
77
Bankruptcy satisfies economic definitions of insurance, transferring risk from debtors (the insured) to creditors (insurers) through the discharge of debt, with debtors paying a riskadjusted premium in the form of an interest rate. 78 By discharging consumer debts, the law redistributes costs of over-indebtedness from consumer debtors (and third parties who bear costs where debtors do not self-insure) to institutional creditors, who represent the party better able both to prevent default from occurring (through creditworthiness assessments and underwriting practices) and to bear the costs of default (as discussed further below). This allows social costs of credit markets to be efficiently spread and internalised, and incentivises creditors to reduce the incidence of default and over-indebtedness.
More practically, one could understand bankruptcy as functionally acting as social insurance, filling gaps left by the Welfare State. 79 Though the continued vital role of the existing social welfare system should not be understated, the dramatic rise in household debt of recent decades has corresponded to a period of reduced welfare provision, as well as increased income inequality and stagnation of wage growth for middle and working classes. 80 These trends have involved a substitution of "loans for wages" 81 and official promotion of borrowing as a means of sustaining economic demand 82 and of smoothing consumption in a manner analogous to traditional welfare state provision. 83 Reduced social spending has seen the financialisation of welfare and the increasing role of the market, rather than the State, in addressing citizens' social needs. 84 Evidence from the Great Recession shows households borrowing to counter austerity policies' reduction of social welfare provision, 85 while significant increases in high cost payday lending in the UK 86 illustrate further this substitution of private debt for public debt. 87 Debt is also used to access "essential services no longer provided by the welfare state", 88 including housing and pension provision. 89 Household credit then becomes the "ultimate market-based social welfare programme". 90 This ex ante borrowing exposes heavily leveraged households to greater vulnerability ex post in the event of an "income shock" or social force majeure that typically leads to over-indebtedness -job loss, wage reduction, relationship breakdown, or ill health. 91 These "life accidents" are of the kind against which the welfare state traditionally protects. Privatisation and the State's promotion of market provision in lieu of social spending, transform the State from service provider to regulator, 92 and create a "regulatory welfare state". 93 Regulatory norms and legal protections, such as personal insolvency law, accordingly must provide a "safety net of last resort", when the net of the traditional Welfare State has failed.
94
These analyses suggest that developments in economic and social policy over past decades, accelerated by recent conditions of recession and austerity, present a clear and urgent policy case for personal insolvency to function as insurance against the risks of excessive debt, both at the individual and aggregate levels. This calls on the law to be expansive in its discharge of debt and, most relevantly to the subsequent discussion, in the protection offered by its stay of enforcement, "the linchpin of bankruptcy relief". 95
Objections to Personal Insolvency's Social Insurance Function
While at least part of the above analysis regarding the economic costs of household overindebtedness may be widely accepted, two key objections tend to oppose the complete embrace of debt relief and adoption of the law's social insurance function. The first worries that debtors will abuse any system of debt relief, while the second cautions that such a system will raise the costs of, and reduce access to, credit. 96 Both of these are common concerns regarding consumer protection and social insurance measures generally, 97 mirroring the classic reactionary argument that reforms will produce opposite effects to those intended by policymakers. 98 When interrogated, however, these objections do not undermine the case for accepting personal insolvency law's social insurance role.
(a) Moral Hazard
The first argument against household debt relief measures cautions that debtors will abuse generous laws, over-borrowing and subsequently escaping their credit obligations. This raises the issue of moral hazard, 99 the risk that the availability of insurance against loss (debt discharge) will reduce the insured's (debtor's) incentives to take steps to prevent default (i.e. borrowing responsibly and striving to overcome financial difficulties). 100 Often overlooked, however, is the fact that moral hazard's original "significance lay not in the recognition that insurance could have undesirable consequences…, but instead in the claim that the undesirable consequences could be controlled." 101 Similarly, personal insolvency systems can use this concept as a guide in designing the law with sufficient safeguards and sanctions "to isolate and exclude debtors who engage in excessively risky or other undesirable credit behaviour."
102
While the social insurance view of bankruptcy sees the availability of debt relief as welfare enhancing, it sees an important need to attach conditions to raise the cost of debt relief (just as insurance policies include deductibles to ensure insured risks are not costless). These include limitations on debtor access (as seen above in relation to the DRO procedure), investigation and potential sanction of culpable debtors, and the debtor's sacrifice to creditors of non-essential income and assets. Thus, the social insurance conception of insolvency retains a role for debt collection, but as a means of guarding against moral hazard, rather than an end in itself. In this light, requiring debtors to undergo a personal insolvency procedure appears more as a solution to, rather than a cause of, moral hazard problems posed by household debt relief policies.
103
(b) "Lenders should feel able to advance money"
A second perennial objection to introducing debtor friendly law reforms is the claim that they will increase the cost of, and reduce access to, household credit. 104 Examples abound of policymakers, judges and commentators 105 expressing assumptions that laws that maximise returns to creditors, and particularly protect banks, enhance welfare in allowing creditors to supply credit widely at low prices. 106 The belief that it is "important that lenders should feel able to advance money" 107 approaches the status of an article of faith in an English private law alleged to demonstrate an "enduring pro-creditor bias". 108 In the context of the "debt overhang"
problem discussed above, typical arguments that the "sky will fall" 109 if creditors' rights are unduly restricted raise a more nuanced question: whether a reduction in supply of cheap household credit would cause greater harm to economic activity than the fall in demand caused by overly leveraged households' declining consumption.
It is precisely this point that contemporary commentators refute when arguing that the severity of the Great Recession indeed resulted from policymakers allowing losses to fall on debtors and "behaving as if the preservation of bank creditor and shareholder value is the only policy goal." 110 Moving from this more general claim to the direct impact of bankruptcy on credit supply, empirical evidence is "surprisingly limited… given the centrality of [this point] to policy debates about bankruptcy reform". 111 Some studies produce ambiguous results, 112 while others find small increases in mortgage prices attributable to differences in bankruptcy laws. 113 Yet more conclude that in modern securitised, diversified credit markets, "the scope of the bankruptcy discharge has very little impact on the price or availability of credit except at the margins." 114 annual personal insolvencies 120 reflect only a small portion of total defaults. These observations suggest that losses to creditors caused by providing greater debt relief in personal insolvency law should reduce lender economic activity (i.e. credit supply) to a lesser extent than the denial of relief will affect over-indebted individuals' behaviour (i.e. consumer spending), particularly bearing in mind debtors' higher marginal propensity to consume. A key insight of insurance theory, that the law can produce efficient outcomes by allocating losses onto the party best placed to bear loss and to prevent relevant risks from occurring, 121 therefore supports debt relief as an efficient transfer of costs onto creditors. A further lesson from the Great Recession is that shifting losses onto debtors may in fact reduce credit flows by stifling demand, since a twosided market view shows that boom time borrowers will have little appetite for credit when economic conditions deteriorate.
122
A more fundamental problem with this typical objection to debt relief is its assumption, foundational to ubiquitous pre-crisis "democratisation of credit" policies, 123 that wide access to cheap credit is necessarily welfare enhancing. The contribution of excessive household debt to the financial crisis, and the effect of the consequent "debt overhang" problem in inducing recession, has led many commentators to doubt this assumption and argue "less finance can be better". 124 This recognition of the need for caution regarding the wide supply of debt at a price concealing its true social costs 125 builds on the pre-crisis emergence of the regulatory principle of responsible lending. 126 Considering these ideas, personal insolvency's role may be precisely to reduce debt flows and ensure that credit markets' costs are internalised through truer pricing, rather than to enforce market bargains blindly. In this way, those outcomes feared by opponents of debt relief should actually benefit the wider economy, while also providing valuable over-indebtedness insurance for which individual debtors may be happy to pay.
No Commons, Just Tragedy: Maintaining Personal Insolvency's Debt Collection Objective when there is Nothing Left to Collect
The contemporary conditions of personal insolvency law's operation provide a final, compelling, factor in favour of understanding personal insolvency law as a form of social insurance and of emphasising its debt relief aim. All Debt Relief Order cases and the vast majority of bankruptcies involve consumer debtors (Figure 1 ) seeking protection by voluntarily initiating proceedings, rather than creditors coercively petitioning for bankruptcy in order to collect debts ( Figure  2) . 128 In fact, it is precisely those debtors unwilling or unable to make repayments to creditors who use the bankruptcy and DRO procedures. Other options such as the IVA procedure or nonstatutory Debt Management Plans (DMPs) are available to debtors able to make part repayments. The steering effects of intermediaries providing these arrangements 129 mean that debtors with saleable assets or available income (to pay both creditors' debts and intermediaries' fees) are less likely to enter bankruptcy. 130 As a result, all DRO debtors and most bankruptcy debtors have few if any non-essential assets available for distribution to creditors (Figure 3 ).
Irrespective of the theoretical conception of bankruptcy, given that the debtor now usually lacks assets and income for recovery to creditors, the "predominant purpose -if not the sole purposeof individual bankruptcy today is to effect the discharge of debts -to give the debtor a 'fresh start'". 131 There is simply nothing left to collect in any bankruptcies bar a small unrepresentative minority of high value cases. Personal insolvency law may once have operated alongside corporate insolvency law as a commercial law designed to recover returns to investors from failed business debtors. It now operates, however, as a social welfare law or "law of hardship".
132
Stakeholders working with the law recognise this, with debt charities viewing insolvency mechanisms as a "lifeline" 133 for impoverished clients and part of a "debt solutions landscape", 134 rather than legal or judicial processes. 135 Similarly, in its recent review of this landscape, the Financial Conduct Authority treated "insolvency/statutory solutions" as just one of many wide-ranging "options for dealing with problem debt". 136 The specialist credit regulator positioned bankruptcy at one end of a spectrum of options, many of which are indisputably welfarist in nature, such as "help with budgeting". Viewed in this light, it is easier to see 128 The split personality of English personal insolvency law means that this small minority of "involuntary" bankruptcies nonetheless remains higher than equivalent rates in jurisdictions such as the USA: J. Therefore, both post-crisis theoretical perspectives and the contemporary practice of the law present a strong case for rebalancing personal insolvency law towards its social insurance function, in expanding access to wide-ranging debt relief. The next part of this paper applies these broad ideas to the particular context of the recent Court of Appeal case of Places for People v Sharples, and the question it raised of personal insolvency law's protection of debtor tenants from eviction. The paper shows how the ideas jostling for primacy in the preceding pages reappear in the Sharples case, though producing a contrasting conclusion. 
Debtor Asset Levels in Bankruptcy Cases, available data
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FINDING A HOME FOR THE FRESH START POLICY
In Places for People Homes Ltd. v Sharples, 138 the Court of Appeal heard joined appeals in two cases where housing associations sought to evict tenants who had fallen behind on rent and sought insolvency protection. The Court answered negatively the central question raised of "whether a bankruptcy order… and a DRO… preclude the making of an order for possession of a dwelling let on an assured tenancy on the ground of rent arrears." 139 The question arose due to uncertainty regarding the scope of insolvency's stay of any creditor's "remedy in respect of a debt", 140 and the effect of a legislative amendment that had exempted the debtor's tenancy from the bankruptcy estate. 141 One can in turn see this uncertainty as more broadly caused by personal insolvency law's ambiguous aims. If the stay of enforcement serves to facilitate the maximisation of creditor recoveries by preserving estate assets for the creditor body, the stay has no reason to prevent an individual creditor from seizing an exempt asset such as a tenancy. Alternatively, if the stay serves debt relief aims, it must offer insurance against the debtor's eviction, since any meaningful fresh start requires stable housing. The case thus required the court to make a stark choice between competing conceptions of the law's aims.
Personal Insolvency Law in a Housing Crisis
In addition to what it says about personal insolvency law more broadly, the case is important in its own right as it relates to the significant contemporary housing problems that have developed during years of austerity, recession and uneven recovery. Figure  4) . 148 Again, these statistics understate the problem of homelessness, as current practices among financially constrained local authorities encourage applicants to avail of informal "housing options" over statutory homelessness applications. 149 Alongside housing costs outpacing income growth, 150 commentators look to austerity policies and reduced public housing support as drivers of these problems. Government has reduced housing allowance for private tenants, "capped" overall levels of benefit payments per household, and placed limits on eligible rents for social tenants under the policy colloquially known as the "bedroom tax". 151 One charity concludes that the "weakening [of] the safety net function of the social rented sector" has contributed to the serious rent affordability problem.
152
The Sharples case raised questions as to how personal insolvency law and policy should respond to the challenges of a shrinking social safety net and increased need for debtor protection from housing unaffordability and eviction. Insolvency policymakers have paid surprisingly little attention to this issue, in contrast to the frequent policy consideration of the treatment of a property-owning debtor's home. 153 A 2008 Insolvency Service review conceptualises "the bankrupt's home" solely as a property owned by the debtor and makes no mention of renters. 
Personal Insolvency Law and the Social Costs of Eviction
While requiring novel application to the context of rental housing debt, the above justifications for personal insolvency law's social insurance function support a policy case for providing relief to tenants facing eviction. Eviction generates not only considerable hardship for debtors, but also significant social costs justifying public policy responses. Literature identifies links between eviction and health problems, 159 and substantial emotional and psychological costs may accompany eviction. 160 Where the debtor can avoid the more drastic consequences of homelessness, she faces significant transaction costs of relocating to alternative accommodation. 161 These include finding somewhere new to live, 162 transporting belongings and abandoning non-transportable items. 163 Upfront deposit payments and high costs of temporary housing arrangements lead many renters to incur further debt, often at high rates.
164
Investments in social networks may be lost, 165 and eviction may force renters to move to areas of higher poverty and crime rates. 166 An evicted debtor may encounter considerable difficulty in obtaining a new tenancy due to the adverse impact of bankruptcy and an eviction order on the debtor's credit history. 167 The recognition of these costs of eviction "suggests that involuntary displacement is a cause, not simply a condition, of poverty and social suffering". 168 Eviction thus pushes debtors further from the fresh start promised by personal insolvency law and pushes housing market costs onto those least equipped to bear them. This should lead to declining economic participation among affected populations, as just one way in which eviction creates considerable negative externalities. Further social costs include the risk of adverse consequences such as detriment to education and development for children forced to undergo relocation. 169 If multiple evictions strike in a particular area, this may increase stress and health problems among residents, 170 while unoccupied premises also create distinct social costs.
171
Significantly, if the debtor is unable to find alternative accommodation in the private market or social rental sector, a duty may fall on the State under housing legislation to provide accommodation, 172 with data above illustrating how this is an increasing occurrence.
The Decision in Sharples: "the provision of shelter and a 'fresh start' to overburdened debtors"? 173
The Sharples case therefore decided whether courts should interpret the Housing Act 1988's exemption of a debtor's tenancy from the bankruptcy estate as a policy intervention addressing these externalities and extending personal insolvency's debt relief to protection from eviction. Initially this appears to be the legislative intention behind the reform, as policymakers originally justified it in terms emphasising debtor rehabilitation:
"… a bankrupt tenant whose tenancy has no financial value is put in an even more unfortunate position if he should lose his tenancy too. If he loses his home, he is not going to be in a position to sort out his affairs..."
174
The Court of Appeal nonetheless rejected this perspective, holding that the stay of creditor enforcement under the bankruptcy and DRO procedures did not prohibit a court order evicting a debtor for non-payment of rent. Relying on precedent predating the law reforms of the 1980s and 2000s described above, 175 the court found that a possession order made on the ground of rent arrears under an assured tenancy 176 is not a remedy in respect of the debt constituted by the rent arrears. Rather, Etherton LJ stated that such an order "is a remedy which restores to the landlord full propriety rights, including rights of occupation and letting, in respect of the property." 177 The judge rejected the debtors' arguments that the object of a claim for possession is to secure payment of arrears. Instead, he held that such a claim relates to a property right independent of a debt and aims "to restore to the landlord the right to full possession and enjoyment of the landlord's property." 178 Thus under neither the bankruptcy nor DRO procedures do the moratoria on debt remedies prevent an order for possession being made.
Alongside a literal interpretative approach, Etherton LJ also reached the decision by considering the purpose of bankruptcy's stay of enforcement. The judge saw this as the protection of the debtor's estate to prevent one creditor obtaining advantage over another and so to maximise the asset pool available for distribution to the body of creditors. 179 Etherton LJ held that since an assured tenancy does not form part of the bankruptcy estate, this purpose would not be frustrated by allowing a landlord to obtain a possession order, as such order would not disadvantage other creditors. 180 Etherton LJ's view was that where individual enforcement only affects property unavailable to other creditors there is no function for the stay to fulfil. This clearly involves an understanding of the stay of enforcement as serving the sole aim of maximising the assets available for distribution to creditors.
Such logic would not seem to extend to Debt Relief Orders. The DRO is open only to debtors lacking disposable income and assets and so involves "no provision relating to the collection, realisation or distribution of the debtor's estate." 181 The judge nonetheless rejected the idea that this factor necessitated a re-evaluation of the scope of the moratorium. While acknowledging the "broad policy point that the object of a DRO is the relief from debt of those with limited means and limited debts", 182 the judgment abandoned a purposive approach in the DRO context.
It instead reverted to a literalist interpretation which would avoid giving "an artificial meaning" to the wording of the relevant legislative provision. 183 The court thus was comfortable adopting a purposive approach when the purpose in question was one of debt collection, but inconsistently was unwilling to allow the debt relief objective determine questions of legislative interpretation. The decision therefore evidences a clear prioritisation of the law's debt collection objective, to the point of marginalising the debt relief aim. This logic overlooks the merits of insolvency law's social insurance function and the public policy case for the law providing a safety net against eviction. Instead, it requires courts to decide the question of whether the law should protect debtors from eviction solely by reference to the purpose of maximising creditor returns.
The second issue decided by the Court was that the status of rent arrears as a bankruptcy debt means that the stays prevent courts from entering judgment for the arrears, as the completion of the insolvency procedure discharges these sums. Similarly, the stays prevent courts from making a suspended possession order conditional on arrears repayment (as this would qualify as a remedy in respect of a dischargeable debt). When deciding these issues, Etherton LJ returned to purposive interpretation, noting, "the DRO regime (and bankruptcy) is designed to restrict the recovery of debt and, when the process is complete, to eliminate it". 184 The judge then concluded that permitting debt recovery through a conditional possession order "would be contrary to that policy". This reasoning on first reading appears to interpret expansively the debt discharge under both procedures and to recognise the law's debt relief aim. In effect, however, the judge's prior holding regarding the stay of enforcement frustrates "that policy" and illustrates the difficulty of attempts to balance the law's competing aims by interpreting certain features by reference to one aim, and others by reference to another. Since insolvency protection will not stop eviction, in practice debtors will be denied this recognised statutory right to discharge, as to stave off eviction debtors will need to repay legally dischargeable rent arrears. As noted with regret by a judge following Sharples, even a debtor under DRO protection who makes current rent payments may suffer eviction based on a pre-existing conditionally suspended possession order. 185 Advice agencies report that many property owners simply ignore a defaulting tenant's entry into insolvency, or perversely take this event as cause to bring eviction proceedings. 186 Consequently, the accepted practice among debt advisors following Sharples is that a debtor must continue to repay rent arrears while under such protection. 187 This practical reality renders ineffective Etherton LJ's conceptual distinction between a remedy in respect of a debt and a remedy to restore landlords' property rights; 188 a distinction that also ignores empirical evidence that housing associations (and, one must equally assume, private landlords) clearly see possession proceedings as a debt collection method. 189 Thus, the Sharples decision has effectively created a divergence between law and practice and undermined statutory provisions in obliging debtors in practice to repay arrears where legislation provides for their discharge from such debts. For those debtors lacking the means to pay, personal insolvency law will provide no protection against eviction.
Sharples and the Social Insurance Function of Personal Insolvency Law: Spreading the Risks of a Debt Based Economy
Despite Etherton LJ's words regarding debt discharge, further comments of the judge seem to acknowledge that the real point at issue was whether insolvency's stay of enforcement prevents eviction. This is evident in Etherton LJ's policy justifications for his decision, which centred on concerns regarding the case's implications for housing providers and other non-defaulting tenants. If insolvency indeed discharges rent arrears, then property owners have already lost these sums and the law imposes no additional costs on them by taking the further step of preventing eviction. In fact, if eviction is avoided property owners might benefit from the rehabilitation of a financially troubled tenant into a debt free occupant, assumedly now better able to keep current on rents. This was far from the view of Etherton LJ, who saw real costs for property owners if unable to evict defaulting tenants, as well as for "non-defaulting tenants who may have to pay higher rents to compensate for the landlord's lost revenue." 190 The judge cautioned that it "could be financially catastrophic for [social] landlords to be unable to recover possession from persistent non-payers and could threaten the availability of social housing to meet the great demand from the large number of people who are economically disadvantaged and seek suitable and affordable permanent accommodation."
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This reasoning calls into question the legitimacy of household debt relief generally, in a manner epitomising the abovementioned classical objections to consumer and social protection measures.
As well as showing a lack of faith in the possibility of debtor rehabilitation, Etherton LJ's view of the debtor as a "persistent non-payer" 192 suggests an underlying assumption of debtor culpability that raises the "spectre of moral hazard". 193 Concerns of ex post moral hazard (that a debtor may exaggerate her need for debt relief) arise in this context since protection against eviction might potentially create incentives for debtors not to make all reasonable efforts to pay rent, a possibility recognised by commentators on the US bankruptcy code. 194 Moral hazard reasoning does not call for a denial of insurance where it could create perverse incentives, however, but rather the structuring of insurance to address such incentives. 195 Thus, eviction moratorium rules in insolvency could alleviate concerns for example by permitting eviction in cases where a debtor is current on all repayments other than rent (suggesting that the debtor was deliberately withholding rent). The law could also permit eviction on grounds other than non-payment of rent, and could learn from amendments to the US Bankruptcy Code that introduced exceptions to the stay on eviction. 196 The law could also treat exceptionally cases in which the rent would be unaffordable even after discharge. Ex ante moral hazard concerns of irresponsible borrowing are less significant in the context of rented properties than for other consumer borrowing, however. Housing is a necessity, rather than a luxury purchase made by a "spendthrift" debtor. 197 Therefore, moral hazard concerns and the problem of potential "persistent non-payment" do not appear to justify the outcome in Sharples.
In respect of Etherton LJ's second classic policy objection that protecting insolvent tenants from eviction would increase costs for property owners and subsequently for non-defaulting tenants, the social insurance function of bankruptcy sees this as an outcome to be pursued rather than a "catastrophe". It seeks to spread the costs of a debt-based economy more widely in order to address externalities and in particular debt overhang problems that result from the market allocation of losses onto those least able to bear them. Insurance theory would reallocate these losses onto housing associations and holders of property portfolios, given they are better placed than debtors (and third parties) both to bear these costs and to prevent them from arising. 198 Property owners, like all lenders, spread and hedge losses, and include default losses in calculating rents charged across their range of tenants. While this process is difficult for smaller owners, those engaging in the commercial activity of renting property for profit must bear accompanying risks and price them accordingly, as traders who do not understand their businesses have no right to remain artificially in the market. 199 Landlords may be less equipped than financial institutions to prevent default through informed credit extension practices. They nonetheless benefit from access to credit reference systems and remain much better placed than individual renters to conduct complex risk assessments regarding tenants' future likelihood of defaulting. Personal insolvency commentators suggest that special considerations might apply to non-profit social landlords of the type at interest in Sharples, 200 and indeed Etherton LJ's judgment emphasises how these property owners' tenancies serve not commercial objectives but a "special social need". 201 Nonetheless one must recognise that the shift of social housing provision from local authorities to housing associations was motivated by politicians' deliberate choice to instigate a "business ethos" in this sector, and accordingly to treat housing associations similarly to private landlords. 202 Housing associations practice such commercial risk management techniques as conducting affordability assessments before letting. 203 This is particularly the case given the increasing consolidation of the sector into a small number of very large providers, since "the bigger the organisation, the more it can insulate itself from external risks." 204 Furthermore, recent legislative changes have authorised social landlords to charge rents closer to market rates, while some larger associations are "moving their focus away from housing those in greatest need towards a more diversified tenant base". 205 As housing associations act more like commercial operators, justifications grow for treating them as such in personal insolvency law. Undoubtedly, particularly thorny policy issues arise at this "interface between legislation governing the provision of… [social] accommodation… and insolvency legislation". 206 It is clear nonetheless that the social insurance model of bankruptcy, and its strong argument in favour of eviction protection, should feature in any policy assessment.
high risk of future insolvency. One must note, however, that landlords already carry out credit history checks to screen prospective tenants, reducing access considerably. 207 Further, if this warning rings true and markets can affordably provide only insecure housing devoid of insurance against economically and socially harmful eviction, then this suggests that law and policy should revisit openly the balance between public and market provision. The current equilibrium, with public provision increasingly replaced by reliance on ensuring market access, has created a necessary new social policy role for law and regulation in allowing citizens to retain "basic… services even when they can no longer afford them through the market." 208 Policymakers have recognised this in their support of defaulting mortgage debtors following the financial crisis, 209 but it is also time for the law to consider in the rental context the appropriate balance between ensuring freedom to access housing and freedom to maintain housing. 210 
CONCLUSION
The decision in Sharples exemplifies reasoning common in judicial 211 and policy decisionmaking in the field of personal insolvency, characterised by an unwillingness to embrace wholly the fresh start policy. Accordingly, the law offers only 'adulterated debt relief', 212 conditioned by the persistent view that it should primarily serve the interests of creditors. A consequence of the law choosing contract enforcement as the predominant regulatory approach 213 is its inability to respond to contemporary challenges and to fulfil its potential to produce positive policy outcomes. This article does not argue that insolvency law is an ideal remedy for social problems better addressed by the welfare system. The law nonetheless must recognise the practical and policy context in which it operates, and its de facto role of last resort insurer against debt crises at both the micro and macro levels. In an important article in the thennascent consumer bankruptcy literature, Niemi asked whether personal insolvency law should aim to cure a market failure or a social problem. 214 In an increasingly financialised world, it appears ever more difficult to draw such a boundary between the market and the social. Private consumer credit and housing markets increasingly replace public provision, but failures in these markets trigger significant social problems for troubled households, while the resultant distribution of losses also generates negative aggregate economic effects. 215 Contemporary scholarship advances a strong policy case for understanding personal insolvency law as a form of social insurance, a means of distributing more equitably and efficiently the risks inherent in a debt-based economy. This calls for recognition of the law's provision of wide-ranging debt relief as its primary objective, to be emphasised over an alternative aim of attempting to produce maximum returns to creditors from what is often a debtor's meagre income and assets. Opposition to this approach is rooted in concerns of moral hazard and fears of reducing credit supply, as evidenced in Etherton LJ's reasoning in Sharples. Analysis of the Global Financial Crisis and Great Recession, however, illustrates the limited control individuals hold over the dynamics of credit and demonstrates the great risks of excessive debt flows. 216 As household debt creeps again towards pre-crisis levels, 217 and austerity policies require citizens to turn ever more to markets for basic needs, it seems an apt time to reimagine the role of personal insolvency law as an insurer of last resort against the contemporary risks of our debt-burdened society.
